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ABSTRACT
As a free port situated in the Leeward Islands of the Caribbean, the Dutch colony 
of St. Eustatius prospered as an entrepot in the late eighteenth century. At its 
height, this tiny island of eight square miles welcom ed an average of eight ships 
per day into its roadstead. The lucrative exchange of both goods and information 
on the island proved essential to America’s  prosecution of the Revolutionary War. 
Drawing on expansive commercial networks which linked the United States to 
Europe via the Caribbean, Congress secured greatly needed military stores for 
the Continental forces. As evidenced in part by the sizable network of 
Philadelphia businessm an Robert Morris, th ese commercial contacts supplied the 
arms and ammunition necessary to prevent the early defeat of Washington’s  
army. The channels opened by St. Eustatius also facilitated diplomatic 
communication between America and potential European supporters as indicated 
by the efforts of Charles Dumas, C ongress’ advocate at The Hague. His reports 
allowed the United States to monitor the volatile relationship between Britain and 
the Dutch Republic while providing Congress a m eans to promote the American 
cause in Europe.
Commercial disputes between Britain and the Dutch Republic culminated with the 
sack of St. Eustatius by Admiral George Rodney in 1781. Papers seized from 
resident merchants illustrate the nature and extent of the island’s  trade network. 
The perspective of a British businessman, Richard Downing Jennings, provides 
further evidence of advantageous connections by showing St. Eustatius was a 
nucleus of an international information exchange. As an intermediary between 
the United States and Europe, St. Eustatius and the greater Caribbean proved to 
be essential to American independence. The goods and intelligence procured 
through its networks enabled the United States to prolong and expand the war 
against Britain.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgements ii
Introduction 1
Chapter 1. America’s  Links with St. Eustatius and the Wider
Caribbean 7
Chapter 2. The European Connection 18
Chapter 3. The Sack of St. Eustatius 25
Conclusion 37
Bibliography 39
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to express my appreciation to Professor Paul Mapp, w hose  
thoughtful insights and constructive suggestions guided this research project. I 
am also grateful to Professor Frabricio Prado and Professor Brett Rushforth for 
their careful reading and valuable discussion of an early draft of this paper.
For a solid introduction to the historian’s  craft and encouragem ent to pursue 
graduate studies, I would like to thank Professor Fred Anderson. I am also 
indebted to A ssociate Professor Deborah Hollis and the staff of the Special 
Collections Department at CU Boulder for their support and advice. Finally, I am 
grateful to my parents for talking me through this year’s  challenges and to my 
brother, for reminding me to laugh.
On November 16, 1776, the guns of Fort Oranje on the Dutch island of St. 
Eustatius fired nine blank shots in a customary response to a salute from a foreign ship. 
On this occasion, the vessel entering the roadstead was the American brig Andrew Doria. 
While Americans were common in Caribbean waters, this ship was among the first to 
proudly fly the new red and white striped flag of the Continental Congress.1 According 
to a contemporary, the fort had welcomed the Andrew Doria “with the Solemnity due to 
the Flags of Independent Sovereign States.” In effect, the salute constituted the first
foreign recognition of the United States of America.
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Figure 1: Map depicting the location of St. Eustatius relative to other islands discussed in the text.
1 "American" is used as a descriptor both by and for the residents of the United States in the primary 
source material that forms the basis of this paper. This is a very narrow definition of the term, as 
"American" is used as an identifier by people of both North and South America.
2 Craister Greathead to Johannes de Graaff, 17 December 1776, in Naval Documents of the American 
Revolution (NDAR) v.7, ed. William Bell Clark, et al. (Washington: Naval History Division, Dept, of the Navy, 
1976), 508.
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As Americans on the island celebrated the reception of the Andrew Doria, and the 
copy of the Declaration of Independence she carried, British observers immediately 
denounced the fort’s actions. In a letter to Johannes de Graaff, governor of St. Eustatius, 
the vice-admiral of the British Leeward Islands station wrote “It is with equal surprize 
and astonishment, I daily hear it asserted in the most positive manner, that the port of St. 
Eustatia has for some time past been openly and avowedly declared protector of all 
Americans and their vessels. Colours and forts of their High Mightinesses have been so 
far debased as to return the salutes of these pirates and rebels; that the subjects of the 
States [are] not satisfied with giving all manner of assistance to the American rebels of 
arms, ammunition, and whatever else may enable them to annoy and disturb the trade of 
His Brittannic Majesty’s loyal and faithful subjects.” In establishing the link between 
the perceived acknowledgement of American sovereignty and participation in the trade of 
warlike supplies, the letter openly questions the governor’s motive in authorizing the 
return salute.
Dissatisfied with the governor’s evasive explanations on this point and angered by 
his additional displays of support for the American cause, Britain demanded action from 
Dutch authorities in Europe. After much prevaricating, the West India Company recalled 
de Graaff for questioning in 1778. In front of the board, de Graaff defended the salute to 
the Andrew Doria as a ritual courtesy extended to all visiting vessels, regardless of 
nationality. When asked whether or not he had recognized the flag as that of the 
Continental Congress, de Graaff answered with a question of his own: how could anyone
3 James Young to Johannes de Graaff, 14 December 1776, in NDAR v.7, ed. Clark, et al., 487.
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prove he had known its origin?4 Steering the conversation away from the actions of the 
fort, de Graaff instead cited several instances of British interference in Dutch trade. St. 
Eustatius was sustained by commerce and, as a neutral port, welcomed the vessels of all 
nations. Having responded to Britain’s demand for action, the officials returned de 
Graaff to his post.
Left unsaid in the proceedings was the acknowledgement that establishing rapport 
with the Americans ensured that St. Eustatius would continue to attract and maintain 
valuable customers. Owing to the island’s proximity to mainland ports, gunpowder sold 
for approximately five and a half times the amount that it could be acquired for in 
Europe.5 De Graaff understandably sought to protect this lucrative business, which 
supplied the island’s marketplace with coveted American products including tobacco, 
indigo, and lumber. As alluded to in the governor’s testimony, the concept of “free ships, 
free goods” (outlined in an Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1668 and reconfirmed in 1674) allowed 
a neutral nation to maintain trade with a belligerent so long as a military disadvantage 
was not imposed on the other side. British officials would counter this oft made assertion 
with the equally pertinent claim that international custom allowed a belligerent to 
obstruct trade which provided the enemy with warlike stores. This contradiction in 
international relations was a central source of friction between Britain and the Dutch 
Republic in the late eighteenth century. In the five years following the fort’s salute to the 
Andrew Doria, tension between the two would increase and culminate in armed conflict.
As the Dutch Republic entered the war against Britain during the final stage of the 
Revolution and never concluded a formal alliance with Congress, its contributions to the
4 Barbara Tuchman, The First Salute: a View o f the American Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1988), 55.
5 Tuchman, First Salute, 20.
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American victory are often overshadowed by those of France. Consequently, the role of 
St. Eustatius as an entrepot and the effects of the overarching commercial dispute have 
received little attention from American historians. Among the few works to address the 
island beyond a few lines is The First Salute: a View of the American Revolution by 
Barbara Tuchman. Writing for a general audience, she effectively uses the intriguing 
operation at St. Eustatius as a hook to draw readers into a narrative on Anglo-Dutch 
relations and the international dimensions of the Revolutionary War. While Tuchman 
successfully illustrates the importance of the island as a vital source of supplies for 
America, her larger analysis suffers from Euro-centrism. In effect, the emphasis on 
European actors and motivations downplays American agency in the outcome of the 
conflict. In order to offer a more complete assessment, this thesis will explore American 
modes of procuring much-needed goods through St. Eustatius as well as the ways in 
which Congress acted on deteriorating Anglo-Dutch relations.
Building on Tuchman’s description of St. Eustatius as an economic entrepot, this 
thesis will also address the island as a hub of information and examine the diplomatic use 
of correspondence passing through the port en route to destinations on both sides of the 
Atlantic. It will make that argument that communication between America and Europe 
was facilitated by commercial networks which linked American agents with their 
international counterparts in the Caribbean and to contacts in Europe. These connections 
not only provided supplies, but proved essential to Congress’ efforts to secure European 
support.
Without the Caribbean to serve as an intermediary, an American victory in the 
Revolutionary War would not have been possible. The substantial quantity of military
4
stores and diplomatic intelligence procured through unofficial commercial alliances 
sustained the Continental forces and enabled Congress to maintain advantageous 
communication with potential backers in Europe. The United States’ profitable use and 
expansion of these international networks also served to compound tension between 
Britain and neutral powers, ultimately leading France (along with Spain, by association) 
and the Dutch Republic into the war. St. Eustatius was a particularly important 
Caribbean port, its neutrality and tradition of free trade making it an entrepot for a 
majority of the war. As a primary hub of exchange, the island prevented the early defeat 
of a weak American military and, following the alliance of 1777, a safe port for the 
French. Commercial disputes between Britain and the Dutch Republic often centered on 
the activities of St. Eustatius’ merchants and their contacts, aggravating existing tension 
to the point of war. In prolonging and expanding the conflict, St. Eustatius was essential 
to securing the independence of the United States.
With the events transpiring on St. Eustatius in November 1776 serving to 
introduce international interest in the island, this paper will explore the use and effect of 
networks from three perspectives. The standpoint of the American mainland will open 
with a brief exploration of its prior connections with St. Eustatius. Links indicated by 
early-eighteenth-century commercial records support the likely possibility that Congress 
drew on pre-existing networks during the Revolution. The commercial contacts of the 
prosperous merchant Robert Morris will demonstrate the reach and use of such systems 
during the war. Correspondence linking Morris, his agents, and Congress evidences the 
importance of connections in procuring supplies.
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The following section will analyze the use of networks from the perspective of an 
agent in Europe. Charles Dumas, a resident of the Dutch Republic, greatly benefited 
from the transatlantic communication system in rallying support for the American cause. 
His correspondence indicates the importance of receiving timely updates from America. 
Furthermore, Dumas’ return reports allowed the United States to monitor the volatile 
relationship between Britain and the Dutch Republic, a conflict which Congress was able 
to act on to its advantage.
The concluding discussion addresses the sack of St. Eustatius, which occurred 
immediately after Britain declared war against the Dutch Republic in 1781. Papers 
seized from merchants illuminate the intricacies of business operations and reinforce the 
island’s centrality to the information network. The perspective of one British 
businessman on St. Eustatius, Richard Downing Jennings, contributes additional insight 
on the universal utility of the island. An analysis of his 1784 pamphlet, written in protest 
of the confiscation of his property, shows that Britain also stood to profit from the 
island’s intelligence networks. Descriptions of the accessibility of strategic information, 
which Jennings offered to share with the British, exemplify the significance of the 
island’s connections and further strengthens the case that St. Eustatius was the nucleus of 
international exchange.
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America’s Links with St. Eustatius and the Wider Caribbean
The salute to the Andrew Doria was only one of many occurrences which drew 
St. Eustatius deeper into the war between Britain and her former colonies. Days after the 
ship’s arrival, Governor de Graaff again found himself having to defend his decision of 
open support and recognition of the American cause. On November 21, 1776, the 
American privateer Baltimore Hero captured the British merchant vessel, May, off the 
coast of St. Eustatius. Sailing out of St. Kitts, the May was seized within sight of both 
islands. A prize crew was put onboard and instructed to make for Delaware, where the 
ship and cargo would be condemned by a prize court. Following the engagement, the 
privateer was welcomed back into the roadstead of St. Eustatius, were it received “every 
mark of support and protection.”6
At the insistence of the British owner, a formal complaint was lodged against de 
Graaff by the governor of St. Kitts, Craister Greathead. The complaint took the form of a 
haughty memorial in which Greathead insisted on an explanation as well as demanded 
restitution for the owner of the May and the “condign punishment” of the American 
“partners, sharers and abettors.”7 This letter strongly suggests that the protection of the 
Baltimore Hero significantly compounded the affront perceived in the island’s official 
recognition of the Andrew Doria. These back to back episodes posed a threat to the long 
established goodwill between the Dutch Republic and Britain. As Greathead informs de 
Graaff, “it must be evident to you, Sir, that a partiality & conduct similar to the one 
herein complained of even in favour of a sovereign state in amity with the States General,
6 Craister Greathead to Johannes de Graaff, 17 December 1776, in NDAR v.7, ed. Clark, et al., 507-508.
7 Greathead to de Graaff, 17 December 1776, in NDAR v.7, ed. Clark, et al., 507-508.
7
but enmity with Great Britain, would be a flagrant violation of the many compacts now 
existing between our two courts.”8
The public recognition and protection of American vessels at St. Eustatius 
conveyed a clear message to America and Britain alike: the Dutch were willing partners 
with America in the Caribbean and a potential ally of the United States in Europe. As the 
British responded with additional memorials and the filing of complaints, Americans 
directed their attention to making use of this perceived friendship. Abraham van Bibber, 
a prosperous merchant on St. Eustatius, noted that “all American vessels here now were 
[wear] the Congress colors. Tories sneak and shrink before the honest & brave Americans 
here.”9 Likewise emboldened, Congressional commissioners in the United States 
increasingly instructed captains bound for the West Indies to salute the fort at all ports of 
call and to visit with island governors.10 By encouraging recognition of the American 
flag, the United States hoped to legitimize its claim to sovereignty and press others into 
displaying support. Increased communication with island governors would strengthen a 
network of contacts vital to the flow of goods and information to and from the United 
States.
Occurring alongside a formal investigation into the salute to the Andrew Doria, 
which involved collecting depositions from multiple observers, the inquiry into the 
capture of the May was drawn out over several months as officials argued over the rights 
and respect due to their respective nations. An examination of the case reveals a strong 
link between Governor de Graaff and the American merchants on St. Eustatius. A
8 Greathead to de Graaff, 17 December 1776, in NDAR v.7, ed. Clark, et al., 507-508.
9 Abraham Van Bibber and Richard Harrison to the Maryland Council of Safety, 19 November 1776, in 
NDAR v.7, ed. Clark, et al., 213-214.
10 Robert Morris to Nicholas Biddle, 15 February 1777, in NDAR v.7, ed. Clark, et al., 1210.
8
witness for the prosecution claimed that the owner of the Baltimore Hero was Maryland’s 
agent on the island, Abraham van Bibber. While known to be true, de Graaff and others 
adamantly denied this charge. Van Bibber himself answered in the negative when asked, 
“Had he ever signed any blank commissions of the Congress of North America, or seen 
any such signed by anyone else on this island?”11 De Graaff clearly understood the 
economic importance of maintaining his connections with American agents on St. 
Eustatius and was willing to circumvent the law to protect this network. According to the 
deposition given by Foster McConnell, owner of the May, “the governor addressed
himself to the deponent and sayed sir, you must take care how you accuse Mr. Vanbibbee
12for if you accuse him it may be of serious consequence to you.”
Van Bibber’s denial of involvement with the privateer and de Graaff s threat to 
McConnell stemmed from mutual commercial interests. Van Bibber, in partnership with 
Richard Harrison on Martinique, had been delivering gunpowder to Maryland and
• 1 'i
Virginia as a state agent as early as March 1776. He found a willing ally in Johannes de 
Graaff, who assumed the role of governor in September of that year. Writing to the 
Maryland Council of Safety in early November, Van Bibber confirms “this is the best 
place by far and grows less difficult to transact here, as the Dutch have discover’d that 
their laws when put in force must ruin their merchants - 1 am on the best terms with his 
Excellency the governor and have his word and promise relative to some particulars that 
gives me great satisfaction and puts much in our powers.. .we are as well fixed with him
11 Quoted in Jan Willem Schulte Nordholt, The Dutch Republic and American Independence (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 40.
12 Deposition of Foster McConnell, January 1777, in NDAR v.7, ed. Clark, et al.,917-918.
13 J. Franklin Jameson, "St. Eustatius in the American Revolution," American Historical Review 8, no.4 
(1903): 685.
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now as we were with the former.”14 The strong connection established between 
Governor de Graaff and Abraham van Bibber exemplifies the important nature of 
exchange on St. Eustatius and reveals the worth of the island to the American cause.
The friendly relationship between St. Eustatius and America predated the 
Revolution by nearly a century. As a free port, the island offered appealing commercial 
opportunities outside the mercantilist structures imposed by Britain and other imperial 
European governments. Loose enforcement of the Navigation Acts, policies designed to 
restrict trade outside the empire, allowed American smuggling to flourish. By the end of 
the seventeenth century, American port cities had established commercial contacts on 
islands throughout the Caribbean. St. Eustatius, in particular, became a popular port of 
call following Britain’s imposition of the Molasses Act in 1733. By placing heavy duties 
on foreign sugar, molasses, and rum, parliament hoped to force Americans to purchase 
the more expensive sugar products of the British islands. Adjusting to demand, St. 
Eustatius developed a market for cheap French molasses and sugar. To manage this 
lucrative trade, which expanded significantly during the Seven Years War (1756-1763), 
agents of several American merchant houses were appointed to the island, further 
solidifying the relationship between the American colonies and St. Eustatius.
In addition to French sugar, American merchants also sought Dutch tea. 
Parliament’s attempt to raise revenue in the colonies, which included a tax on British tea, 
made the product of the Dutch East India Company an appealing alternative. By 1770,
St. Eustatius was the primary supplier of tea to the American colonies. Many New 
England merchants, including John Hancock, corresponded directly with merchants in the
14 Quoted in Jameson, "St. Eustatius," 690-691.
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Dutch Republic. Hancock’s commercial network included Joan Hodshon, Thomas and 
Adrian Hope, and Jean de NeufVille, all merchants of Amsterdam.15 An established 
relationship with St. Eustatius and a familiarity with its commercial practices would 
greatly benefit America in the coming conflict.
In 1775, the resources of the colonies were stretched thin as a boycott of British
imports went into effect and European companies imposed new limitations on credit
extended to Americans. Everyday goods became scarce and valuable. In a letter to her
husband John, Abigail Adams requested that he purchase a box of pins in Philadelphia,
even at the cost of ten dollars16. Of greater concern to Congress than the lack of
household supplies was the dangerous deficit of military stores. Gunpowder, in
particular, was badly needed. As described by General Washington shortly after the
Battle of Bunker Hill, “we are so exceedingly destitute that our artillery will be of little
use, without a supply both large and seasonable. What we have must be reserved for the
11small arms, and that managed with the utmost frugality.” In an effort to maintain moral,
1RWashington would fill his powder barrels with sawdust to conceal the shortage.
Congress received several similar pleas for supplies over the course of the year, 
particularly from the besieged state of New York. In July 1775, its Committee of Safety 
implored, “We have no arms, we have no powder, we have no blankets. For God’s sake, 
send us money, send us arms, send us ammunition.”19
15 Victor Enthoven, '"That Abominable Nest of Pirates,'" Early American Studies 10, no.2 (2012): 286.
16 Helen Augur, The Secret War of Independence (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1955), 34.
17 Augur, Secret War o f Independence, 35.
18 Charles Rappleye, Robert Morris: Financier o f the American Revolution (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
2010), 36.
19 Augur, Secret War o f Independence, 35.
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Several American merchants had been procuring quantities of gunpowder from 
their Caribbean contacts as early as 1774. A majority of these stores, however, were not 
offered to Congress. Coastal provinces were inclined to hoard ammunition for their own 
defense while profiteers stockpiled barrels in anticipation of a better market. While 
undoubtedly aware of the commercial opportunities available, Congress initially declined 
to open trade with foreign powers in Europe or the West Indies. With reconciliation still 
a viable option, the body could not approve a measure which would further offend 
Britain. In the early stages of the war, therefore, the Continental Army and needy local 
militias relied on the meager stores of gunpowder garnered from raids on royal arsenals, 
the capture of British ships, and a short-lived program of home manufacture.
The rejection of the Olive Branch petition and Britain’s subsequent Proclamation 
of Rebellion in August 1775 indicated that reconciliation would not so easily or quickly 
be achieved. As a result, the American mindset began to shift toward complete 
independence from the mother country. Congress, now fervently considering the position 
of its forces in relation to Europe’s strongest military power, soon moved to establish its 
own contacts abroad. Not only were military supplies needed, but knowledge of potential 
allies and other means of foreign support. By the summer of 1776 Continental vessels 
were arriving at Caribbean ports to gage the sentiment of foreign officials on American 
independence. The warm welcomes received, most famously the salute to the Andrew 
Doria, encouraged the expansion of networks in these ports. America would come to 
rely on St. Eustatius, and the wider Caribbean, to relay goods and intelligence from 
Europe in support of the war effort.
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The Secret Committee of Trade, formed in September of 1775, was initially 
charged with negotiating contracts for arms and ammunition, but within months it was 
empowered to direct all aspects of foreign trade. Members were prominent American 
merchants, among them the well-known Philadelphia businessman Robert Morris. His 
firm, Willing & Morris, was one of several contracted to supply materials requested by 
Congress, including gunpowder, weapons, and sailcloth as well as medicine and lead for 
bullets.
Within four months of his appointment to the Secret Committee, Morris was 
invited to join the Marine Committee, a group charged with raising a Continental Navy, 
and the Committee of Secret Correspondence, tasked with establishing diplomatic 
relations with foreign powers. Participation in these three organizations granted Morris 
substantial influence in the expansion and management o f transnational networks. Such 
authority also made him a significant point of contact in the flow of goods and 
information. Operating in Philadelphia, Morris obtained a lucrative contract with the 
merchant company Penet and Pliame of France. In directing these negotiations and 
overseeing several others, he established and maintained a network of contacts 
throughout the Caribbean. The extent of Morris’ Caribbean network is revealed in his 
instructions to Captain Nicholas Biddle, of the Continental frigate Randolph: “Should 
you take any prizes in the West Indies that are bona fide British property... you may send 
them into Martinico to the care of William Bingham Esqr -  to St. Eustatia to the care of 
Sami Curzon junr Esqr -  At Curacoa [Curaqao] to Mr. Govemeur -  at the Cape Francois
9 0to Mr. Ceronio, at St. Nicholas Mole [Saint-Domingue] to Mr. John Dupuy.” As this
20 Robert Morris to Nicholas Biddle, 15 February 1777, in NDAR v.7, ed. Clark, et al., 1210.
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network encompassed both French and Dutch contacts in colonies spread throughout the 
Caribbean, Morris ensured multiple options for international exchange.
American operations in the Caribbean can be epitomized by Morris’ agent, 
Stephen Ceronio, who was posted at Cape Francis, Martinique to manage the 
transshipment of munitions from Europe through neutral island ports. In directing trade, 
Ceronio made several trips to the nearby islands of St. Eustatius, St. Thomas, and St. 
Croix. At each port, Ceronio assumed the identity of an agent for Willing & Morris, a 
cover story which enabled him to avoid suspicion in conducting business for the Secret 
Committee. Enhancing this deception, Ceronio’s negotiations often included private 
transactions on behalf of his contractor, Robert Morris. The mix of private trade and 
official business was not only lucrative, but practical. These transactions supported 
Ceronio’s residence on the island as remittances from the fledgling American 
government were sporadic and in any event did not cover his living expenses. Mixing 
cargos also provided additional cover for vessels en route to America and allowed 
Ceronio to dispatch greatly needed munitions quickly, rather than waiting to ship a full 
cargo. Interest and participation in markets for different commodities likely diversified 
contacts and widened networks. This practice of engaging in private and public 
commerce simultaneously was used by agents throughout the Caribbean.
The urgency of acquiring supplies sped the development of Morris’ network. 
Samuel Curzon, an agent at St. Eustatius, was also receiving consignments from the 
Secret Committee as early as 1776. Over the following year-and-a-half, several ships 
were directed to pick up cargos and dispatches from him as well as from the island’s
14
other congressional agents, Cornelius Stephenson and Henricus Godet.21 Robert Morris 
acknowledged that the Secret Committee owed Curzon a great debt, clear recognition of 
his successful business ventures in 1777.22 Curzon formed a partnership with Isaac 
Gouvemeur, an American agent at the Dutch port of Cura9ao, in the fall of 1778.
Records indicate that their company had numerous contacts in the Dutch Republic, 
including Amsterdam merchants Nicolaas and Jacob van Staphorst, Alexander 
Honingman, Robout van Loon, Johannes Hoffina, and Jacob van Bunschoten, as well as 
Hassell and Tasker of Rotterdam. These connections linked the Dutch islands and 
extended back to the Netherlands, a valuable network for aiding American efforts to 
forge stronger connections with Europe.
Congress drew on the Caribbean network and its international links in February 
1776 to request that blankets, clothing, and stockings be procured by the commissioners 
in Paris. As director of transnational exchange, Robert Morris assured the Secret 
Committee, “A copy [of the request] certified by myself goes by the Independence & you 
had best send me some more for other opportunitys.”24 These “other opportunities” imply 
use of his extensive network to transmit information. The significance placed on 
successfully obtaining these supplies is apparent in an earlier letter to Nicolas Biddle. 
After instructing the captain to call on agents at Martinique, St. Eustatius, and other 
Caribbean ports to receive cargo and exchange dispatches, Robert Morris urges him to 
proceed with haste back to America: “The uncertainty of the fate of war makes us
21 Continental Marine Committee to James Robinson, 12 March 1777, in NDAR v.7, ed. Clark, et al., 1236.
22 Elizabeth Nuxoll, Congress and the Munitions Merchants: the Secret Committee o f Trade during the 
American Revolution 1775-1777 (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1985), 475.
23 Enthoven, "'That Abominable Nest of Pirates,"'290.
24 Robert Morris to the Secret Committee of Correspondence, 19 February 1777, in NDAR v.7, ed. Clark, et 
al., 1236.
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cautious of saying positively which shall be the best port... you are to be known to small 
cruizers by a white jack at the fore top mast head and a pendant over it. Shew this same 
signal to the light house and we will send down orders there to answer it by a white sheet
9  ^if  all is well.” Several cruisers would be on the lookout for the Randolph, ready to lend 
assistance. The care with which ships were brought back to American ports emphasizes 
the reliance of Congress on its island contacts and the value placed on transactions 
occurring in the Caribbean.
In the early years of the Revolutionary War, networks throughout the Caribbean 
ensured the steady supply of arms and ammunition to the United States and also served as 
important channels of communication. As the conflict continued, the formalization of the 
French Alliance in February of 1778 shifted clandestine trade and diplomatic 
communication directly to St. Eustatius. Since Martinique and other French ports were 
no longer neutral, they were considered vulnerable to British attack. These 
circumstances, coinciding with the return of Johannes de Graaff from questioning in 
Europe, produced an economic boom on St. Eustatius. According to records kept by a 
Dutch admiral directing convoys of merchant vessels, 3,182 ships sailed from St. 
Eustatius in 1778-1779, an average of seven or eight per day. One ship, seized by the 
British, carried 1,750 barrels of gunpowder and 750 stands of arms, along with bayonets 
and cartridge cases. This cargo was a small sample of the military supplies which made 
their way to American shores. In exchange, that same year, 12,000 hogsheads of tobacco 
and 1.5 million ounces of indigo were shipped from America to St. Eustatius.26
Robert Morris to Nicholas Biddle. 15 February 1777, in NDAR v.7, ed. Clark, et al., 1210.
26 All figures from Tuchman, The First Salute, 56.
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British patrols outside the port increased along with activity on the island, a sure 
sign of the importance of the island’s connections. While British threats may have 
deterred some merchants, John Adams judged “from the success of several enterprizes by 
way of St. Eustatia, it seems that trade between the two countries [Dutch Republic and 
United States] is likely to increase.”27 The frequency of exchange between St. Eustatius 
and the United States boded well for the relay of information along with goods. Tensions 
were flaring between Britain and the Dutch Republic in Europe; as no doubt the 
Committee of Secret Correspondence anxiously awaited news which would inform their 
decision on how best to proceed with the prosecution of the war.
27 John Adams to the President of Congress, August 4 ,1779, Papers o f John Adams, v. 8, Massachusetts 
Historical Society Digital Edition, http://www.masshist.org/publications/apde/portia.php?id=PJA08d082.
17
The European Connection
The transatlantic exchange of information was of immense importance to the 
success of the war effort. Without a constant flow of news from American sources, 
European courts would be reliant on what news Britain chose to spread. A primary 
destination for correspondence traveling through the islands was the Netherlands. As a 
center of diplomacy, The Hague was an ideal location to sound out envoys of different 
courts on the possibility of an eventual alliance with America. To make these overtures, 
the Committee of Secret Correspondence appointed Charles Dumas, a scholar and
American enthusiast, as its agent in the Dutch Republic in 1775. It is likely that Dumas
28was an acquaintance of Benjamin Franklin, who had toured the Netherlands in 1766. 
Dumas’ written instructions emphasize the importance of his role and illuminate a portion 
of the network he would be incorporated into: “We desire also that you take the trouble of 
receiving from Arthur Lee, agent for the Congress in England, such letters as may be sent 
by him to your care, and of forwarding them to us with your dispatches.. .send your 
letters to him under cover, directed to Mr. Alderman Lee, merchant, on Tower Hill, 
London, and do not send by post, but by some trusty shipper.. .And when you send to 
us.. .we recommend sending by way of St. Eustatia, to the care of Messrs. Robert and 
Cornelius Stevens, merchants there, who will forward your despatches to me 
[Franklin].”29
Recognizing France as a potential ally, Dumas’ diplomatic efforts began at its 
embassy. As the French already held an active interest in America, his advocacy on
28 Nordholt, Dutch Republic and American Independence, 48.
29 Benjamin Franklin to Charles Dumas, 19 December 1775, in Diplomatic Correspondence of the American 
Revolution (DCAR) v.5, ed. Jared Sparks (Washington: John C. Rives, 1857), 190.
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behalf of Congress likely reiterated information gathered from their own intelligence 
network. More valuable was the information Dumas forwarded to the United States.# 
Reporting back to Franklin, he writes, “In the conversation I had with this [French] 
Minister, I observed that the wishes of his nation are for you.. .we have gained this 
advantage, that an opening is made which must dispose France in your favor, and engage 
her to tolerate and secretly to encourage even, any assistance your vessels can derive 
from France, Spain, and the Indies.”
Positive reports from Dumas, corroborated by several other contacts in both the 
Caribbean and Europe, prompted Franklin to travel to Paris and engage in diplomatic 
efforts directly. In notifying Dumas of this development, the Secret Committee 
reaffirmed his importance as a point of contact in their network : “We request to hear 
from you frequently.. .Your letters, via, St. Eustatia, directed to the Committee of Secret 
Correspondence, then put under a cover to Mr. Robert Morris, merchant, Philadelphia, 
and that letter covered to Mr. Cornelius Stevenson, or Mr. Henricus Godet, merchants at 
St. Eustatia, or under cover to Mr. Isaac Gouveneur, merchant at Curracoa, will certainly 
come safe, and if you can send with them regular supplies of the English and other
-7 1
newspapers, you will add to the obligation.”
With Franklin actively negotiating treaties of amity and commerce with France in 
1777, Dumas focused his attention and resources on expanding local connections and 
raising support among the Dutch. The Republic was deeply divided on American 
independence. Opinions of the conflict were not ideologically based, rather were formed
30 Charles Dumas to Benjamin Franklin, 30 April 1776, in DCAR v.5, ed. Sparks, 191-192.
31 Committee of Secret Correspondence to Charles Dumas, 24 October 1776, in DCAR v.5, ed. Sparks, 217- 
218.
19
in response to a political debate flaring in the States General. Both the army and the navy 
required rearmament, which force should be given priority was an issue that split the 
nation. Inland provinces, which maintained connections with the England, argued for 
developing land forces that would equal those of France. Coastal provinces, on the other 
hand, relied on oceanic trade and favored strengthening the navy to protect commerce. 
Furthermore, as France was rumored to be on the verge of entering the war against 
Britain, shippers anticipated an increase in demand for neutral carriers. Well aware of 
this long standing debate, Dumas sought out connections with Amsterdam businessmen, 
the driving force behind the mercantile lobby.
Dutch merchants were interested in establishing direct commercial connections 
with an independent America, yet knew little about the United States. As Dumas 
conveyed to Congress: “they complain everywhere of knowing nothing of your affairs
39but what the English wish Europe should know.” Correspondence traveling through the 
American network kept Dumas well informed of recent military victories, news which he 
spread to great effect. Writing to the Committee, he quotes from a letter written by a new 
contact: ‘“I received on the 11th the account of the victory of General Gates [at Saratoga]. 
It was pulled out of my hands. I pray you, as soon as you receive advice that Howe has 
done as well as Burgoyne [British General at Saratoga], to let me have the great pleasure 
of knowing it first, that I may regale many persons with the news. You cannot think what 
a bustle there is yet in all companies and cafes about this affair, and how they fall on the
32 Charles Dumas to the Committee of Foreign Affairs. 14 June 1777, in DCAR v.5, ed. Sparks, 239.
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English Ministers.”33 As illustrated by this response, the demand for news about America 
enabled valuable information to reach a wide audience.
In 1779, increased British patrols in northern European waters and the Caribbean 
pushed the States General to consider the appropriate response to such interference with 
trade. This debate, which Dumas relayed to the United States, again split the nation 
according to interest. The mercantile lobby advocated for the implementation of 
“unlimited convoy”, an armed escort for all merchant ships sailing from the Republic. 
While a convoy would benefit Dutch commerce, opponents claimed the British would 
interpret its use as the resistance to search. To question Britain’s right to protect the 
waters of the Channel would be to question British sovereignty. Anxiety over increasing 
British aggression in the West Indies, particularly around St. Eustatius, prompted 
Admiral Bylandt to call attention to the vulnerability of the island. In addition to the 
necessity of protecting ships traveling to and from the West Indies, Fort Oranje required 
reinforcement.
While provincial councils favored unlimited convoy, the States General refused to 
confirm the vote. Despite this decision, a convoy of merchantmen set sail on December 
31, 1779 under the command of Admiral Bylandt. Off the Isle of Wight, in the English 
Channel, the Admiral refused the signal of a British squadron to standby for search. After 
firing two warning shots at the sloop dispatched to conduct the inspection, Bylandt’s 
convoy was attacked by the British squadron. So as not to incite war, Bylandt allowed 
his ships to be the taken into British custody. Enraged by this incident, the States General 
voted in favor of unlimited convoy in April 1780.
33 Dumas to the Committee of Foreign Affairs. December 16,1777, DCAR, v.5, 242.
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Thanks to an informative network, the increasing tension between the Dutch 
Republic and Britain was well known to American leaders. In order to gauge its effect on 
Dutch sentiment toward America, specific orders were relayed by Dumas to Captain John 
Paul Jones. After capturing a British vessel, Jones was to request shelter in the harbor of 
Amsterdam. Forced to act openly on the presence of an American warship and its prize, 
Dutch officials would publically indicate their intentions toward the United States. On 
October 3, 1780, John Paul Jones arrived in the roadstead following the famous 
engagement between his ship, the Bonhomme Richard, and the British vessel Serapis. 
Jones was received as a hero and granted both shelter and care for the wounded. 
Nevertheless, he was publically denied access to stores of ammunition and was 
adamantly encouraged to sail as soon as possible. His claims to having been issued a 
French commission, conveniently lost during battle, enabled Dutch officials to save face 
in front of the British. While a decisive recognition of American sovereignty was not 
achieved, the commissioners’ plan had served a purpose. As William V, the Prince of 
Oranje, wrote to a magistrate, “a secret treaty has been made between Amsterdam and the 
Americans,” and Jones’ motive is “to put the Republic under the necessity of taking 
various steps that could be considered as a kind of recognition of their independence.”34
The secret treaty to which William V refers developed simultaneously with the 
Jones affair and demonstrates the reach of American networks. Shortly after the 
conclusion of the French-American alliance, Dumas had forwarded a copy of the 
corresponding commercial treaty to Pieter Van Berckel, Amsterdam’s chief magistrate. 
Van Berckel, in turn, established a connection with the American agent in Germany,
34 Quoted in Nordholt, Dutch Republic and American Independence, 72.
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William Lee. Dumas’ information and Van Berckel’s contact resulted in the “accidental” 
meeting of Jean de Neufville, an Amsterdam merchant, with Lee to discuss and draft an 
unofficial commercial treaty between the Dutch Republic and the United States. The 
possibility of a sanctioned treaty circulated through the town councils of Amsterdam and 
Holland, but a formal decision on the issue was not made. Nevertheless, rumors of a 
secret Dutch-American treaty leaked and were soon reported in English newspapers.
The unofficial treaty drafted by de Neufville and Lee traveled through the 
Caribbean network to Philadelphia where it was forwarded to Henry Laurens, who was 
preparing to replace John Adams as an American envoy at The Hague. Laurens sailed 
from Philadelphia in August 1780. His ship, the Mercury, was stopped by H.M.S. Vestal, 
cruising off Newfoundland. Following protocol, Laurens threw his important papers 
overboard in a bag weighted with shot. Unfortunately for Laurens, the bag had not been 
sufficiently deflated and it bobbed on the surface where it caught the attention of a British 
sailor. Among the incriminating papers recovered by the British was a copy of the 
commercial treaty and related correspondence.
The existence of a commercial treaty, though unsanctioned, proved the spark that 
precipitated Britain’s declaration of war against the Dutch Republic on December 20,
1780. Outlining British grievances against the Dutch in a speech to parliament, Lord 
North cites the provisioning of France with warlike stores, the commercial treaty with 
America, the acceptance of John Paul Jones, and the salute to a rebel ship at St. Eustatius. 
Each of these listed causes for war can be directly linked to the activities of the American 
network.
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During his time as British ambassador to The Hague, Joseph Yorke became well 
aware of the success of the American network. More than a month prior to the official 
declaration of war he outlined the necessity of making an attack on St. Eustatius: “It is 
sufficient to cast an eye upon the Custom House lists of the Rebel Ports in North America 
to see what is carrying on through St. Eustatius, Curacao and other Dutch settlements, but 
above all the former.. .As these places, but St. Eustatius in particular, are the channels of 
correspondence and connection with North America...” to take it would “cut off the 
intercourse between Amsterdam and His Majesty’s enemies and rebellious subjects, till 
satisfaction is given for the past, and security for the future.” Shortly after delivering the 
declaration of war, orders were given leading to the sack of St. Eustatius.
35 Quoted in Jameson, "St. Eustatius," 95.
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The Sack of St. Eustatius
Admiral George Brydges Rodney, commander of the Barbados and Leeward 
Islands squadron, received the secret orders on January 27, 1781. His fleet, based at St. 
Lucia, represented the first line of defense for the British West Indies and North America. 
Admiral Rodney was a capable leader of what was considered to be the most important 
naval station in the Atlantic. In May 1779,'he had engaged the French fleet in the 
Caribbean and averted its attempt to capture Barbados. The enemy squadron was so 
badly damaged that the French commander was also forced to abandon his secondary 
objective of proceeding to America.
The conquest of St. Eustatius nearly two years later would temporarily mar 
Rodney’s status as a celebrated admiral. His obsession with the island’s legendary 
fortune precluded effective management of the squadron. As the French fleet under 
Admiral de Grasse sailed unimpeded from Europe and through the Caribbean en route to 
Virginia, Rodney was busily engaged in auctioning off goods plundered from the island’s 
rich storehouses. “The lairs of St. Eustatius,” Admiral Samuel Hood later remarked, 
“were so bewitching as not to be withstood by flesh and blood.” Such carelessness 
contributed directly to the British defeat at Yorktown.
An impressive force comprised of fifteen British ships of the line, carrying three 
thousand troops under General John Vaughan, arrived off St. Eustatius on February 3,
1781. With a garrison of fewer than sixty men and a single Dutch warship in port, the 
island was incapable of defending itself against this superior force. For the honor of its
36 Quoted in Andrew Jackson O'Shaughnessy, The Men Who Lost America: British Leaadership in the 
American Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), 292.
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flag, two rounds were defiantly fired from Fort Oranje before Governor de Graaff 
surrendered unconditionally to Admiral Rodney. To the inhabitants, unaware of the 
Dutch Republic’s recent entry into war, the island’s instant capture “was as sudden as a
37clap of thunder.. .as tremendous as it was rapid.”
Following the conquest of St. Eustatius, which included the capture of 150 
merchant ships in the bay and a convoy of 30 vessels recently departed for Holland, 
Rodney spent three months overseeing the plunder of the island and the auction of its 
goods. The warehouses of Oranjestad’s lower town, which stretched for over a mile and 
averaged a combined rent of £1.2 million per year, yielded approximately £3 million in 
cash and trade goods. The admiral had found these storehouses overflowing with
I Q
merchandise, leaving even “the beach covered with tobacco and sugar.” Under orders 
to confiscate all private property, British troops ransacked the residences of upper town 
and stopped individuals on the street to search them “in the most shameful manner.”40 As 
prisoners of war, residents were later grouped by nationality to be deported to 
corresponding islands. So efficient was the extraction of wealth from the island and so 
harsh the treatment of its inhabitants, that Rodney’s conduct would later be denounced in 
Parliament as the equivalent of a “sentence of beggary pronounced indiscriminately 
against all.”41
37 Quoted in Harold A. Larrabee, Decision at the Chesapeake (New York: Clarkson N. Potter, Inc., 1964), 
164.
38 Warehouse rent, in Larrabee, Decision at the Chesapeake, 162. Estimate of plunder, in Tuchman, First 
Salute, 97.
39 Quoted in Jameson, "St. Eustatius", 96.
40 Quoted in O'Shaughnessy, Men Who Lost America, 297.
41 Quoted in O'Shaughnessy, Men Who Lost America, 297.
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As the sack of St. Eustatius was swift and unexpected, business records and 
correspondence which might otherwise have been destroyed were also confiscated. 
Among the papers most carefully inspected by Rodney were those belonging to Samuel 
Curzon and Isaac Gouvemeur, both American agents of Congress. Their recent 
implication in the proposed commercial treaty between America and the Dutch Republic 
made the merchants of particular interest to the British government. Spanning from May 
1779 to January 1781, the letter books and records of Curzon and Gouvemeur illuminate 
the nature of business conducted on St. Eustatius as well as the expansive commercial 
network which had been fostered by the island’s status as a free port.
Records pertaining to the shipment of arms and ammunition to America are 
necessarily circumspect. To accommodate the risk of interception, requests for military 
stores were generally only alluded to. In addition to a list of conventional goods, for 
example, one contact pointedly asked that Curzon and Gouvemeur “do the needful.”42 
As suppliers for Congress and agents of individual states, the partners drew on a far 
reaching network of commercial contacts. Their papers indicate connections with 
merchants across the Caribbean (particularly at Curasao and St. Croix), and in Europe 
(primarily Amsterdam). Interestingly, the earliest letter in the set, dated May 15, 1779, is 
from William Manning of London. The brief missive served to acknowledge a bill of 
exchange issued by Robert Downing Jennings (a British merchant at St. Eustatius) on the 
prestigious Amsterdam house of Thomas and Adrian Hope. While the particulars of this 
transaction are unknown, the entanglement o f British citizens in a business which directly 
supported the enemy was not uncommon, particularly on St. Eustatius. The situation was
42 Quoted in Ronald Hurst, The Golden Rock: an Episode o f the American War of Independence, 1775-1783 
(London: Leo Cooper, 1996), 66.
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deplored by Admiral Rodney, who described these merchants as “traitors to their king 
and parricides to their country.”43 He would later justify his callous actions against the 
island’s entire population with a statement seemingly aimed at the Dutch: “a perfidious 
people, wearing the mask of friendship, traitors to their country, and rebelling against 
their king deserve no favor or consideration.”44
In addition to documenting commercial activities, the papers of Curzon and 
Gouvemeur are typical of the St. Eustatius merchant community in their attention to local 
events and the current state of international affairs. By the late 1770s, the Eastern 
Caribbean had become a focal point of the war. These years saw the capture of the 
islands of Dominica, St. Martin, and St. Bartholomew by the French and the seizure of St. 
Lucia by the British. While St. Eustatius had long been protected by its neutrality, 
Americans on the island undoubtedly observed with concern the increasing number 
British warships gathering at St. Kitts, only five miles away.
Letters to Curzon and Gouvemeur reflect the effects of the strengthened British 
presence in the Caribbean -  “accidents” including the delay of shipments and loss of 
cargoes are lamented on several occasions. Reports of a disruption in commerce often 
incorporate further remarks on the larger state of affairs. Latimer Holstead of 
Portsmouth, Virginia writes, “I hope ere long all those injured nations will adopt some 
salutary plan as to deter and at least prevent.. .such unwarrantable proceedings.. .whether 
we shall have it in our power long to enjoy trade with you is at present uncertain as it will 
depend altogether on the spirited remonstrance.. .their High Mightinesses shall make to
43 Quoted in O'Shaughnessy, Men Who Lost America, 299.
44 Quoted in O'Shaughnessy, Men Who Lost America, 299.
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the freedoms taken by the British men of war and cruizers.”45 This reference to the 
League of Armed Neutrality echoes the interests of several merchants. The formation of 
such a coalition against Britain would decrease the present risks involved with shipping.
The multinational character of its inhabitants made St. Eustatius an entrepot for 
the world’s news as well as for its goods. Both family links and commercial connections 
ensured news from Europe reached the island. The heavy traffic of ships, usually seven 
to ten arrivals per day and regular convoys of thirty or more, promoted the circulation of 
this information around the Atlantic.46 Curzon and Gouvemeur were thus occupationally 
and geographically situated to serve as a valuable link on this information network.
A letter to the partners from the Van Staphorst brothers of Amsterdam mentions 
the enclosure of a missive from “his Excellency John Adams Esq. to your good selves, 
which please to make use of and to forward.. .by the first safe conveyance.” The letter 
continues, “You’ll no doubt be acquainted before this reaches you that Mr. Laurens, old 
President of Congress, on his voyage to Europe has been taken by the English and is kept 
a close Prisoner in the Tower of London.. .of which Mr. A[dams] will give you some 
particulars.. .we are extremely sorry for this unhappy event, since we have a notion that 
his being in this Country would have been of great Success to the American cause. The 
news you gave us of the most extraordinary Conduct of the English at St. Martin was 
known already here, before we got your letter. It should certainly be very surprising if 
experience had not proved us sufficiently that these desperados are capable of doing 
anything whatsoever that they think convenient.. .”47 The strength of the partners’
45 Quoted in Hurst, Golden Rock, 69.
46 O'Shaughnessy, Men Who Lost America, 291.
47 Quoted in Hurst, Golden Rock, 76-77.
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position at St. Eustatius is evident in both their implied contribution to the commercial 
treaty carried by Henry Laurens and their role in the transfer of news and intelligence.
That a majority of the letters seized from Curzon and Gouvemeur were sent from 
America or Amsterdam would have been, in Rodney’s view, evidence enough to confirm 
their guilt by association. References found within to transactions on behalf of “your 
government” and to key members of Congress only augmented the perceived depths of 
their treachery. Curzon and Gouvemeur were immediately placed under arrest to await 
transport to London to stand trial. As the figurehead of the island’s lucrative trade with 
America, Governor de Graaff was also sent to England. He was charged by Rodney with 
being “the first man who insulted the British flag by taking up the salute of a pirate and a 
rebel, and who, during his whole administration has been remarkably inimical to Great 
Britain and a favorer of the American rebellion.” The names of two of the captured ships, 
de Graaff and Lady de Graaff further “prove how much the Americans thought 
themselves obliged to him.”
Admiral Rodney’s decision to return to England with the West India convoy in 
late August 1781 was motivated in part by a desire to defend himself against the public 
censure of his actions at St. Eustatius. To this end, the Caribbean squadron was 
dispersed, leaving only fourteen ships (a third of the original fleet) under Admiral Hood 
to rendezvous with the five ships of Admiral Graves in North America. On September 5, 
1781, these nineteen British ships of the line, with a total of fifteen hundred guns, met de 
Grasse’s force of twenty-four warships and two thousand guns in the Chesapeake Bay.49 
The French victory at the Virginia Capes forced the surrender of General Cornwallis at
48 Quoted in Tuchman, First Salute, 97.
49 O'Shaughnessy, Men Who Lost America, 312.
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Yorktown. Blame for the subsequent loss of the North American colonies initially fell on 
Admiral Rodney. As the commander of what was considered to be the most important 
naval station in the Atlantic, his duty was to head the fleet at sea in anticipation of the 
arrival of a hostile fleet. That Rodney prolonged his stay on St. Eustatius in order to 
auction off goods indiscriminately plundered from the island’s residents indicated to 
many officials a gross neglect of responsibility. His delayed and inaccurate intelligence 
reports to General Sir Henry Clinton and Admiral Thomas Graves in New York were also 
raised in the inquiry. Speaking in Parliament, Lord Shelburne opined that he “solemnly 
believed that the capture of Lord Cornwallis was owing to the capture of St. Eustatius.”50
In addition to government officials, the displaced merchants of St. Eustatius and 
their associates loudly criticized Rodney’s behavior. The newly formed Society of West 
India Planters and Merchants in London submitted a formal address to the king (which 
was also printed and distributed to the public) and organized a delegation to meet directly 
with Lord Germain, Secretary of State for America. French businessmen were in a 
similar state of uproar, going so far as to suggest that their own government settle 
accounts through a similar extraction of wealth from the occupied British islands of 
Grenada, Dominica, and St. Vincent. Retaliation was of the utmost concern to Britain as 
Rodney had clearly acted in disregard of both moral norms and well-established Customs 
of warfare. In declaring the residents of St. Eustatius pirates, the admiral could justify his 
conduct by a loophole which denied outlaws legal status. Despite past acceptance of 
legal ambiguity in the Caribbean, European officials now favored adherence to
50 Quoted in O'Shaughnessy, Men Who Lost America, 292.
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international customs in the region. When the British and the French occupied each 
other’s islands, compliance with the terms of honorable surrender was expected.
Regardless of the public outcry and the pointed accusations leveled against him, 
Rodney survived the official inquiry into his management of St. Eustatius. As suggested 
by Horace Walpole, the admiral’s staunch support of the North administration led many 
in Parliament to vote against their consciences in his favor. Rodney would ultimately 
redeem his reputation and win immunity from further censure with an astonishing victory 
against de Grasse’s French fleet in the Battle of the Saintes, occurring in April 1782 off 
of Dominica. Although he quickly rose to celebrity, the repercussions of the sack of St. 
Eustatius loomed in the background for years to come.
The brutal pillage of St. Eustatius resulted in over one hundred suits being filed 
against the admiral in England’s law courts. Ninety of these claims sought amounts of 
over £300,000 and collectively totaled the approximate equivalent of Rodney and 
Vaughan’s combined commission. Although several of these cases lasted for years, a 
majority of British merchants were eventually fairly reimbursed (France would receive 
two million livres from the government). In light of his losses, Rodney blamed the 
merchants’ victory on the disappearance of the written evidence he had collected at St. 
Eustatius. These record books and letters had been sent to Lord Germain, from whose 
office a great number mysteriously vanished. The admiral’s friends blamed his political 
enemies. An alternate account suggests their removal was per the request of London’s 
wealthy merchants. The vast amount of wealth Rodney was able to extract from St. 
Eustatius confirms that the island was the center of an intricate network. Evidence of the
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extensive amount of information flowing to and from this island is supplied by British 
citizen Richard Downing Jennings.
Jennings, former resident of St. Eustatius and business contact of American 
agents Curzon and Gouvemeur, filed a claim for £70,000 against Rodney. The delay in 
settling his account prompted him to write a pamphlet outlining the sack of the island and 
his present situation. The Case o f an English Subject was originally published in 1784 
and includes references to the nature of business transactions as well as the potential the 
island had held for the British as an information hub.
Bom in Bermuda, Jennings moved to St. Eustatius “for the purpose of trade only, 
with the laudable intention of bettering my fortune, but not of abandoning my country.”51 
Describing the commercial opportunities available at St. Eustatius, he emphasizes the 
importance of the island’s community to the Empire. As a merchant, Jennings expanded 
the market for British manufactures, provisioned the sugar colonies, and in one instance 
supplied arms and ammunition to the governor of St. Kitts. “It is to be regretted,” he 
states “that it [St. Eustatius] had no credit for the advantages it afforded this kingdom and 
its colonies, and that some of the British commanders on that station neglected the offers, 
as well of supplies as of intelligence, made from thence.”
In June 1780, Jennings had voluntarily gathered information on behalf of an 
official at St. Kitts who had received several anonymous intelligence tips. The same 
offer was made to Admiral Rodney soon after his arrival in the Caribbean. In an 
unsigned letter dated March 31, 1780, Jennings stressed that it would be unremarkable
51 Jennings, Richard Downing. The Case o f Richard Downing Jennings, an English Subject (London: J.W. 
Galabin, 1790), 5.
52 Jennings, Case o f an English Subject, 9.
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for a merchant to make frequent trips to Martinique, “the grand rendezvous of the 
enemy.” St. Eustatius itself also held great potential in this regard as “there are many of 
these vessels that bring intelligence of an interesting nature. Certain accounts sometimes 
come from the French islands of their force, expected supplies, etc.. .from America, 
intelligence of consequence is often brought. Lastly, vessels may frequently arrive from 
Europe, bringing some important news.. .vessels from Holland are coming in almost 
daily: and from these circumstances, there is hardly a French or English reinforcement 
coming out that previous notice is not received at St. Eustatius before it arrives.”54
In The Case o f an English Subject, Jennings depicts the admiral’s arrival at St. 
Eustatius in February 1781 as unexpected and his subsequent actions as equally 
astonishing. Despite acting on Rodney’s requests for supplies, Jennings found his 
property confiscated and his family “formally banished in a manner so unworthy of the 
British character.”55 Observing the auction of looted goods, which included military 
stores, he was outraged by the decision to grant special permits to interested parties from 
enemy ports (those from Martinique, in particular). Greed had overcome the desire for 
imperial security: “the French commanders by these means were regularly informed of 
what was passing; they knew perhaps better than Lord Hood when that admiral was to 
expect the reinforcement of these [Rodney’s] ships and captains.”56 Based on the details 
supplied by Jennings, the intelligence network centered on St. Eustatius was universally 
available and extremely valuable. The diverse national backgrounds and motivations of
53 Quoted in Hurst, Golden Rock, 62.
54 Hurst, Golden Rock, 63.
55 Jennings, Case o f an English Subject, 15-16.
56 Jennings, Case o f an English Subject, 22-23.
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the island’s population were essential to supporting this lucrative exchange of 
information.
In addition to Jennings’ misfortune, the attack on St. Eustatius ruined the 
livelihood of several other Bermuda-born merchants. These traders formed a significant 
portion of the white, non-Dutch community on the island and, like their Dutch 
counterparts, had dealt with American, French, Spanish, and British contacts alike. With 
a reputation as the safest carriers, fast sailing Bermuda sloops were continuously 
employed by merchants to deliver valuable cargos to American ports -  among the few
5 7that were caught was a vessel carrying 400 barrels of gunpowder and 150 muskets. 
Additionally, an estimated 1,000 of these swift vessels were built on Bermuda and
c a y
refitted at St. Eustatius to be sold to Americans as privateers.
Since Bermuda relied on the American mainland for food supplies, America’s 
boycott of British imports threatened to place considerable strain on the island. The 
potential severity of lost trade compelled many Bermudians to sympathize with the 
Revolutionary cause. Henry Tucker Sr., head of a prosperous merchant family, 
successfully petitioned Congress in July of 1775 to continue trade with the island. 
Receiving news of a well-stocked, unguarded arsenal in St. George, Congress resolved to 
trade food for military stores with any ship reaching its coast. As a token of friendship, a 
special concession also promised basic stores including candles, soap, and lumber to the 
island.
57 Michael J. Jarvis, In the Eye o f All Trade: Bermuda, Bermudians, and the Maritime Atlantic World 1680- 
1783 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 406.
58 Augur, Secret War of Independence, 57.
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Since this initial exchange attracted closer British surveillance, Bermuda came to 
depend on its merchants at St. Eustatius for continued access to American provisions and 
other essential supplies. Nearly one quarter of its fleet was engaged in this trade which 
helped sustain the island and its salt raking camps in the Turks. Jennings, among others, 
also coordinated the shipment of American goods to similarly distressed British colonies 
and warships in the Leeward Islands. The business was lucrative and, as Jennings 
emphasizes in his pamphlet, legally permissible after 1777. Parliament’s concession to 
allow limited participation in contraband trade blurred the definition of loyalty to the 
Empire, an allowance which Rodney was unwilling to acknowledge.
The admiral’s failure to realize the potential of the intricate intelligence networks 
illuminated by Jennings likely resulted from personal opposition to what the island 
represented. That London, too, opposed most involvement with an island notorious for 
contraband trade suggests Britain itself did not realize the strategic advantages of such 
connections. In striking contrast, Congress understood that merchants on St. Eustatius 
were essential links to networks which could supply America with both military stores 
and intelligence. By appointing agents, Congress ensured crucial information was 
consistently conveyed across the Atlantic. In providing news on the changing situation in 
Europe and facilitating communication with diplomats abroad, these networks were 
essential to securing the foreign support necessary for an American victory.
36
Conclusion
St. Eustatius never fully recovered from the blow dealt by Admiral Rodney. After 
nine months of British occupation, a French force captured the island and, in 1784, 
returned it to Dutch rule. The decline of St. Eustatius as an active entrepot and the 
conclusion of the Revolutionary War saw the island’s connections with the United States 
fade away. Samuel Curzon died in a British prison, while Isaac Gouvemeur and several 
other American merchants made their way back to the United States in search of other 
opportunities. While Americans have moved on, the legacy of St. Eustatius as the 
“golden rock” of the Caribbean and as an early supporter of independence is well 
remembered by islanders. November 16, the anniversary of the salute to the Andrew 
Doria, is celebrated as a national holiday.
The fort’s acknowledgement of the American flag in 1776 was a nod to merchants 
of all nations as much as it was a recognition of agents of the United States. St. Eustatius 
was sustained by multinational participation in trade and it profited from the spread of 
transatlantic networks. Expanding these networks, American merchants procured 
essential supplies for the United States. While tensions with Britain were of the utmost 
concern to the Dutch Republic, closer commercial relations with the United States proved 
to be a driving force in fostering interest in the American cause. Profitable exchange 
through St. Eustatius no doubt strengthened this sentiment.
American diplomatic interests were also well served by transatlantic networks 
which relayed vital news and information to and from Europe. Correspondence enabled 
Congress to disseminate favorable information and to use the intelligence it received to 
pursue foreign recognition of American sovereignty. The extensive use of these
37
networks calls attention to the crucial role the Caribbean islands, most especially St. 
Eustatius, played in supporting military and diplomatic efforts during the war. As an 
intermediary between America and Europe, St. Eustatius proved to be a vital source of 
information and supplies.
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ABSTRACT
As a free port situated in the Leeward Islands of the Caribbean, the Dutch colony 
of St. Eustatius prospered a s  an entrepot in the late eighteenth century. At its 
height, this tiny island of eight square miles welcom ed an average of eight ships 
per day into its roadstead. The lucrative exchange of both goods and information 
on the island proved essential to America’s  prosecution of the Revolutionary War. 
Drawing on expansive commercial networks which linked the United States to 
Europe via the Caribbean, Congress secured greatly needed military stores for 
the Continental forces. As evidenced in part by the sizable network of 
Philadelphia businessm an Robert Morris, th ese  commercial contacts supplied the 
arms and ammunition necessary to prevent the early defeat of W ashington’s  
army. The channels opened by St. Eustatius also facilitated diplomatic 
communication between America and potential European supporters a s  indicated 
by the efforts of Charles Dumas, C ongress’ advocate at The Hague. His reports 
allowed the United States to monitor the volatile relationship between Britain and 
the Dutch Republic while providing C ongress a m eans to promote the American 
cau se  in Europe.
Commercial disputes between Britain and the Dutch Republic culminated with the 
sack of St. Eustatius by Admiral George Rodney in 1781. Papers seized  from 
resident merchants illustrate the nature and extent of the island’s  trade network. 
The perspective of a British businessm an, Richard Downing Jennings, provides 
further evidence of advantageous connections by showing St. Eustatius w as a 
nucleus of an international information exchange. As an intermediary between  
the United States and Europe, St. Eustatius and the greater Caribbean proved to 
be essential to American independence. The goods and intelligence procured 
through its networks enabled the United States to prolong and expand the war 
against Britain.
